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Dealing with monopolies and state enterprises: WTO rules for goods and services

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  • Mattoo, Aaditya

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to assess the adequacy of multilateral rules dealing with monopolies and state enterprises, particularly in the domain of services. This paper argues that since these rules depend largely on the other obligations undertaken by Members, a variety of exemptions and exclusions have weakened the rules considerably. Furthermore, liberalization of services trade, aided by negotiations under the GATS, is leading to changes in market structure and the pattern of ownership. These changes imply that government-mandated monopolies or non-competing oligopolies are disappearing from the infrastructural services for which Article VIII of GATS is most relevant. The behaviour of dominant suppliers that often remain does not fall within the scope of Article VIII and has been addressed by creating other disciplines. The paper assesses how much emphasis needs to be placed on pro-competitive regulation to ensure competitive market conditions and argues that there is a need to strengthen Article VIII and widen its scope to deal with certain generic problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Mattoo, Aaditya, 1997. "Dealing with monopolies and state enterprises: WTO rules for goods and services," WTO Staff Working Papers TISD-98-01, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wtowps:tisd9801
    DOI: 10.30875/3db350e0-en
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aaditya Mattoo, 1996. "The Government Procurement Agreement: Implications of Economic Theory," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(6), pages 695-720, November.
    2. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619, Elsevier.
    3. Tuthill, Lee, 0. "The GATS and new rules for regulators," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(9-10), pages 783-798, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monopoly; international trade; services; protection; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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