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Politiques d'achats publics et spécialisations internationales

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  • Federico Trionfetti

Abstract

Discriminatory government procurement may (but does not have to) interfere with international specialisation and trade flows. This paper offers a general introduction to the findings of the theoretical literature, provides some descriptive statistics on public procurement and gives a brief overview of regulatory initiatives at international level.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Trionfetti, 2002. "Politiques d'achats publics et spécialisations internationales," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(1), pages 141-150.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_152_0141
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619, Elsevier.
    2. Miyagiwa, Kaz, 1991. "Oligopoly and Discriminatory Government Procurement Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1320-1328, December.
    3. Aaditya Mattoo, 1996. "The Government Procurement Agreement: Implications of Economic Theory," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(6), pages 695-720, November.
    4. repec:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:47:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
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