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Why the Weak Win: The Strategic Role of Investment in Lobbying

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  • Richard Damania

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

Recent empirical work suggests that old er and less efficient industries are typically more successful at securing trade protection and income support. Similarly, environmentally damaging industries often lobby effectively for less stringent environmental regulations. This paper explains the lobbying success of these industries in terms of strategic role of investment as a credible commitment device.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Damania, 1998. "Why the Weak Win: The Strategic Role of Investment in Lobbying," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 1998-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:1998-09
    as

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    File URL: https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp1998-09.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619, Elsevier.
    2. Anderson, Kym, 1995. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 401-423, January.
    3. Conrad Klaus, 1993. "Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 121-135, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    trade policy; interst groups; investments; industry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade

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