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Majority Vote on Educational Standards

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  • Schwager, Robert

Abstract

The direct democratic choice of an examination standard, i.e., a performance level required to graduate, is evaluated against a utilitarian welfare function. It is shown that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low if the marginal cost of reaching a higher performance reacts more sensitively to ability for high than for low abilities, and if the right tail of the ability distribution is longer than the left tail. Moreover, a high number of agents who choose not to graduate may imply that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low even if these conditions fail.

Suggested Citation

  • Schwager, Robert, 2013. "Majority Vote on Educational Standards," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79971, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79971
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Popov, Sergey V. & Bernhardt, Dan, 2010. "University Competition, Grading Standards and Grade Inflation," MPRA Paper 26461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Betts, Julian R, 1998. "The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 266-275, March.
    3. Oliver Himmler & Robert Schwager, 2013. "Double Standards in Educational Standards – Do Schools with a Disadvantaged Student Body Grade More Leniently?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(2), pages 166-189, May.
    4. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, April.
    5. Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2010. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 34-63, May.
    6. Oliver Himmler & Robert Schwager, 2013. "Double Standards in Educational Standards – Do Schools with a Disadvantaged Student Body Grade More Leniently?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(2), pages 166-189, May.
    7. Lydia Mechtenberg, 2009. "Cheap Talk in the Classroom: How Biased Grading at School Explains Gender Differences in Achievements, Career Choices and Wages," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1431-1459.
    8. Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2006. "Cheap talk in the classroom," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-019, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    9. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:3:p:1764-1778 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano STAFFOLANI & Maria Cristina RECCHIONI, 2016. "Increasing Graduation and Calling for More Autonomy in Higher Education: Is It a Good Thing? A Theoretical Model," Working Papers 419, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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