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Transactions that did not happen and their influence on prices

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  • Kirman, Alan P.
  • Härdle, Wolfgang
  • Schulz, Rainer
  • Werwatz, Axel

Abstract

This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. The special feature of the data is that we have details of counteroffers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. Each offer, counteroffer and refusal conveys information to the two parties concerned about the state of the market since no prices are posted and there is ignorance of the total quantities available of each product. We examine the evolution of prices during the day and analyse the relation between the final price struck and the proposals of the two parties. We show what happens to the seller's first price and to the transaction price as the seller revises his idea of the distribution of the buyer's reservation price. We show that periods with no buyer refusals, of offers or bargaining with no transaction will lead to a revision of the seller's first price. More importantly the sharing of the surplus moves in the buyer's favour during the day. These presumptions are then shown to be confirmed by our data set.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirman, Alan P. & Härdle, Wolfgang & Schulz, Rainer & Werwatz, Axel, 2002. "Transactions that did not happen and their influence on prices," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2002,45, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200245
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alan Kirman & Sonia Moulet & Rainer Schulz, 2008. "Price Discrimination and Customer Behaviour: Empirical Evidence from Marseille," Working Papers halshs-00349036, HAL.
    2. Moulet, Sonia & Rouchier, Juliette, 2008. "The influence of seller learning and time constraints on sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 2322-2348, July.
    3. Joshua Sherman & Avi Weiss, 2015. "Price Response, Asymmetric Information and Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 2077-2115, December.
    4. Guerci, E. & Kirman, A. & Moulet, S., 2014. "Learning to bid in sequential Dutch auctions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 374-393.
    5. Alan Kirman & Sonia Moulet, 2008. "Impact de l'organisation du marché: Comparaison de la négociation de gré à gré et des enchères descendantes," Working Papers halshs-00349034, HAL.
    6. Franck Galtier & François Bousquet & Martine Antona & Pierre Bommel, 2012. "Markets as communication systems," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 161-201, January.
    7. Juliette Rouchier, 2013. "The Interest of Having Loyal Buyers in a Perishable Market," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(2), pages 151-170, February.
    8. Giulioni, Gianfranco & Bucciarelli, Edgardo, 2011. "Agents’ ability to manage information in centralized markets: Comparing two wholesale fish markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 34-49.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Markets;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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