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The Real Estate Brokerage Market and the Decision to Disclose Property Condition Defects

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  • Jonathan A. Wiley
  • Len V. Zumpano

Abstract

This article presents a theoretical model of the decision to disclose property condition defects by a real estate broker. The model introduces the costs and benefits of disclosure into the broker's profit function. The comparative static results of the model show that a number of factors will have a deterministic influence on the broker's expected profit and, hence, the broker's decision to disclose. Whether voluntary disclosure occurs depends upon the costs of repairing the defect, prevailing market conditions, commission rates and the legal environment in which the broker operates.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan A. Wiley & Len V. Zumpano, 2008. "The Real Estate Brokerage Market and the Decision to Disclose Property Condition Defects," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 693-716, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:36:y:2008:i:4:p:693-716
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00227.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    2. Xun Bian & Justin C. Contat & Bennie D. Waller & Scott A. Wentland, 2023. "Why Disclose Less Information? Toward Resolving a Disclosure Puzzle in the Housing Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 443-486, February.

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