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From full to bounded rationality: The limits of unlimited rationality

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  • Güth, Werner
  • Kliemt, Hartmut

Abstract

Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is a central function of modeling choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior of boundedly rational individuals. In view of such a causal role of theories we discuss how advice of a theory of boundedly rational behavior can become known, be followed among boundedly rational individuals and still be good advice.

Suggested Citation

  • Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 2001. "From full to bounded rationality: The limits of unlimited rationality," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,12, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200112
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth, 2002. "NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    2. Kliemt, Hartmut, 2011. "Bukantianism—Buchanan's philosophical economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 275-279.
    3. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco & Sandri, Serena, 2007. "Recursivity and Self-Referentiality of Economic Theories and Their Implications for Bounded Rational Actors," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 03/07, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    4. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner G³th & Hartmut Kliemt, 2003. "Reflections on Equilibrium: Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 257-302.
    5. Markus Pasche, 2002. "Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic Case," Working Paper Series B 2002-01, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration.
    6. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Georg v. Wangenheim, 2006. "Verstehen, Verständigung, Vertrag - Ökonomik als Geistes-, Natur- und Staatswissenschaft," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.

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