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Rational Choice and Rule-Following Behavior

Author

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  • Bernd Lahno

    (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Sonnemannstr. 9-11, D-60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, b.lahno@arcor.de)

Abstract

While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of deliberation. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximization principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and coordination rules. It is argued that within RC no satisfying account of such rule-following behavior can be given. In particular it is impossible to determine suitable preference orderings such that coordinating may be understood as maximizing relative to these orderings. Still, once there is coordination, following a coordination rule may be perfectly consistent with the basic assumptions of RC. So there might be a more complex theory of action that incorporates RC as well as a satisfying theory of rule-guided behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Lahno, 2007. "Rational Choice and Rule-Following Behavior," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(4), pages 425-450, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:19:y:2007:i:4:p:425-450
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463107083737
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Amrei Lahno & Bernd Lahno, 2018. "Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 393-422.
    2. Achim Schlüter & Insa Theesfeld, 2010. "The grammar of institutions: The challenge of distinguishing between strategies, norms, and rules," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(4), pages 445-475, November.

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