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Democratic Peace – A Principal-Agent Approach

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  • Leonhardt, Nadine

Abstract

The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I find that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information asymmetries in crisis bargaining. This provides an alternative theoretic explanation of democracies‘ signaling advantage which may turn out to be more realistic than the concept of audience costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonhardt, Nadine, 2013. "Democratic Peace – A Principal-Agent Approach," Ruhr Economic Papers 453, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:453
    DOI: 10.4419/86788511
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Weeks, Jessica L., 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 35-64, January.
    2. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 233-266, April.
    3. Rosato, Sebastian, 2003. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 585-602, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    democratic peace; principal-agent problems; crisis bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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