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A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers

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  • Bouwen, Pieter

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to empirically test a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the EU multi-level system. First, I propose the theoretical framework that attempts to explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest representation(companies, associations and consultants) to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of supply and demand of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policymaking process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. I then derive a number of specific hypotheses about the access of the aforementioned organizational forms. These hypotheses are analyzed in an extensive empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 126 exploratory and semi-structured interviews the hypotheses are checked across the three EU institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bouwen, Pieter, 2002. "A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/7, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:p0028
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    1. Gemma Carolillo & Piero Mastroberardino & Claudio Nigro, 2013. "The 2007 financial crisis: strategic actors and processes of construction of a concrete system," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(2), pages 453-489, May.
    2. Voloshinskaya, Anna (Волошинская, Анна) & Komarov, Vladimir (Комаров, Владимир), 2015. "Evidence-Based State Policy [Доказательная Государственная Политика]," Published Papers mak2, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    3. Anna Zabkowicz, 2015. "Governing economic interests by the European Commission," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 14(1), pages 95-111, March.
    4. Rainer Eising, 2007. "Institutional Context, Organizational Resources and Strategic Choices," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 329-362, September.

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