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Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions

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  • Salisbury, Robert H.

Abstract

Interest group theory traditionally assumed that policies advocated by group representatives in some sense grow out of the interests or values of the group's members. Mancur Olson and others compelled important revisions in this assumption, but still left the process of interest advocacy to membership groups. It is contended here that institutions, such as corporations or local governments, occupy a dominant position with respect to interest representation in Washington, and this finding requires substantial revisions in both theoretical and descriptive formulations of the governmental process.

Suggested Citation

  • Salisbury, Robert H., 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 64-76, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:78:y:1984:i:01:p:64-76_25
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    Cited by:

    1. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, 2004. "Bias in the Heavenly Chorus," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 5-29, January.
    2. Martina Battisti & Martin Perry, 2015. "Small enterprise affiliations to business associations and the collective action problem revisited," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 559-576, March.
    3. David Lowery & Virginia Gray & Matthew Fellowes, 2005. "Sisyphus Meets the Borg," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(1), pages 41-74, January.
    4. Nicole Bolleyer, 2021. "Civil society – Politically engaged or member-serving? A governance perspective," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 495-520, September.
    5. Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo & James Stoutenborough & Arnold Vedlitz, 2015. "Scientific advocacy, environmental interest groups, and climate change: are climate skeptic portrayals of climate scientists as biased accurate?," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 133(4), pages 607-619, December.
    6. Schmid, A. Allan & Soroko, David, 1997. "Interest groups, selective incentives, cleverness, history and emotion: The case of the American Soybean Association," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-285, February.
    7. Contandriopoulos, Damien & Brousselle, Astrid & Larouche, Catherine & Breton, Mylaine & Rivard, Michèle & Beaulieu, Marie-Dominique & Haggerty, Jeannie & Champagne, Geneviève & Perroux, Mélanie, 2018. "Healthcare reforms, inertia polarization and group influence," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(9), pages 1018-1027.
    8. Bouwen, Pieter, 2002. "A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/7, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    9. Robert J. Bennett, 1998. "Business associations and their potential contribution to the competitiveness of SMEs," Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 243-260, January.
    10. Marcel Hanegraaff & Arlo Poletti, 2021. "The Rise of Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: An Agenda for Future Research," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 839-855, July.
    11. Paul Johnson, 1988. "On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 217-235, September.
    12. Joost Berkhout & Jan Beyers & Marcel Hanegraaff, 2023. "The Representative Potential of Interest Groups: Internal Voice in Post-Communist and Western European Countries," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(1), pages 50-64.
    13. Matt Grossmann, 2006. "The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 107-124, June.
    14. Iain McMenamin & Roger Schoenman, 2007. "Together Forever? Explaining Exclusivity in Party–Firm Relations," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(1), pages 153-173, March.

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