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Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission

Author

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  • Andreas Broscheid
  • David Coen

Abstract

We propose an informational model of lobbying to understand macro-characteristics of lobbying systems. We are particularly interested in the number of lobbyists in a system, and the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists. Empirically, we seek to explain the post-Maastricht lobbying boom in the European Union and the concomitant establishment of European Commission forums for interest representation. Using a simple model of informational lobbying with many lobbyists, we show that there is a relationship between lobbying costs, the number of lobbyists, and the informational content of lobbying messages. In conclusion, we propose three different categories of lobbying systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Broscheid & David Coen, 2003. "Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 165-189, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:165-189
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116503004002002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8602 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Cornelia Woll, 2007. "Leading the Dance? Power and Political Resources of Business Lobbyists," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8602, Sciences Po.
    4. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Cornelia Woll, 2006. "Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8523, Sciences Po.
    6. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Kröger, Sandra, 2008. "Nothing but consultation: The place of organised civil society in EU policy-making across policies," European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) 3, CONNEX and EUROGOV networks.
    8. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8602 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Cornelia Woll, 2006. "Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective," Post-Print hal-01021182, HAL.
    10. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8602 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Massaro, Maria, 2019. "Is business lobbying in the European Union context-dependent? Evidence from the policy field of radio spectrum," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(10).
    12. Galia J. Benítez, 2018. "Business Lobbying: Mapping Policy Networks in Brazil in Mercosur," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 7(10), pages 1-30, October.

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