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Wie der Europäische Gerichtshof und die Kommission Liberalisierung durchsetzen: Befunde aus der MPIfG-Forschungsgruppe zur Politischen Ökonomie der europäischen Integration

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  • Höpner, Martin

Abstract

Die ohne Zutun der europäischen Politik vom Europäischen Gerichtshof und der Kommission betriebene 'Integration durch Recht' hat eine extensive Dynamik der Liberalisierung entfaltet. Wie lässt sich dieser Umstand erklären? Mit dieser Frage hat sich die 2008 gegründete MPIfG-Forschungsgruppe 'Die Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration' während ihrer ersten Forschungsphase beschäftigt. Der Beitrag fasst die wichtigsten Befunde zusammen. Die juridische Integration wird auf zwei Wegen aktiviert: durch die an fortschreitender Integrationsvertiefung interessierte Kommission und durch Private, die im europäischen Recht ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen erkennen. Diese Interessen treffen am EuGH auf eine Richterschaft mit einem spezifisch proeuropäischen Vorverständnis von den Aufgaben richterlicher Rechtswahrung. Der Spielraum, dieses Vorverständnis zur Geltung zu bringen, ergibt sich aus der Unwahrscheinlichkeit der nachgelagerten politischen Korrektur von EuGH-Entscheidungen. Die Gründe für die Schwierigkeiten politischer Korrekturen liegen ihrerseits in der Struktur des politischen Systems Europas, in der politökonomischen Konfliktstruktur zwischen den heterogenen EU-Mitgliedstaaten, in der Verfügbarkeit von Kommissionsstrategien zur Entzweiung potenzieller Abwehrkoalitionen und in dem schrittweise-kumulativen Charakter der betriebenen Rechtsfortbildung.

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  • Höpner, Martin, 2014. "Wie der Europäische Gerichtshof und die Kommission Liberalisierung durchsetzen: Befunde aus der MPIfG-Forschungsgruppe zur Politischen Ökonomie der europäischen Integration," MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:148
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