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Der blinde Fleck der Change-Management-Literatur: Wie Hold-Up-Probleme den organisatorischen Wandlungsprozess blockieren können

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  • Will, Matthias Georg

Abstract

Change Management beeinflusst die Wohlfahrt von Mitarbeitern, Managern und Organisationseinheiten auf unterschiedliche Weise. Selbst wenn organisatorischer Wandel langfristig einen positiven Wohlfahrtseffekt hat, können Widerstände entstehen, die sich als einseitige Rationalfallen identifizieren lassen. Es existieren rationale Gründe, den Wandel trotz wechselseitiger Besserstellungspotentiale zu blockieren. Aufbauend auf einer interaktionstheoretischen Rekonstruktion werden zwei Heuristiken entwickelt: (1) Wie können Change Manager diese Rationalfallen entdecken, und (2) welche Gegenstrategien sind erforderlich, damit Mitarbeiter den Wandel wollen, anstatt ihn umsetzen zu sollen? Die hier analysierten Rationalfallen können durch einseitige Bindungen überwunden werden. Abschließend zeigt dieser Beitrag, dass einseitige Rationalfallen unabhängig von der Hierarchie existieren können.

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  • Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Der blinde Fleck der Change-Management-Literatur: Wie Hold-Up-Probleme den organisatorischen Wandlungsprozess blockieren können," Discussion Papers 2012-10, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:201210
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