IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/mlucee/201219.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Erfolgreicher organisatorischer Wandel durch die Überwindung von Risiken: Eine interaktionstheoretische Perspektive

Author

Listed:
  • Will, Matthias Georg

Abstract

Organisatorischer Wandel impliziert in vielen Fällen eine Zunahme der Risiken für die Belegschaft. Hieraus ergeben sich oft Widerstände. Dieser Beitrag veranschaulicht, wie Change Manager mithilfe geeigneter Governance-Strukturen die Risikoproduktivität im Unternehmen erhöhen können. Dies führt zu einer wechselseitigen Besserstellung, weshalb risikoaverse Mitarbeiter und Manager einen riskanten organisatorischen Wandel sogar aus Eigeninteresse akzeptieren. Methodologisch erfordert die Freilegung wechselseitiger Besserstellungspotentiale eine Gestaltung der Restriktionen individuellen Handelns anstatt einer Veränderung der risikoaversen Individuen.

Suggested Citation

  • Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Erfolgreicher organisatorischer Wandel durch die Überwindung von Risiken: Eine interaktionstheoretische Perspektive," Discussion Papers 2012-19, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:201219
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/170377/1/dp2012-19.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-1093, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Ingo Pies & Markus Beckmann & Stefan Hielscher, 2010. "Value Creation, Management Competencies, and Global Corporate Citizenship: An Ordonomic Approach to Business Ethics in the Age of Globalization," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 265-278, June.
    3. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Andreas Klinke & Ortwin Renn, 2002. "A New Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: Risk‐Based, Precaution‐Based, and Discourse‐Based Strategies," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(6), pages 1071-1094, December.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    6. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    7. Miller,Gary J., 1992. "Managerial Dilemmas," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521372817.
    8. Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 21-43, Spring.
    9. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1986. "Risiko als Produktionsfaktor," Munich Reprints in Economics 19879, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    10. Will, Matthias Georg, 2011. "Change Management und nicht-monetäre Vergütungen: Wie der organisatorische Wandel das Mitarbeiterverhalten beeinflusst," Discussion Papers 2011-18, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    11. Gary J. Miller, 2008. "Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 14, pages 349-370, Springer.
    12. Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Change Management und Interaktionspotentiale: Wie Rationalfallen den organisatorischen Wandel blockieren," Discussion Papers 2012-9, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    13. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    15. Richard A. Bettis & Vijay Mahajan, 1985. "Risk/Return Performance of Diversified Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(7), pages 785-799, July.
    16. Hielscher, Stefan, 2009. "Morality as a factor of production: Moral commitments as strategic risk management," Discussion Papers 2009-14, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Change Management und Interaktionspotentiale: Wie Rationalfallen den organisatorischen Wandel blockieren," Discussion Papers 2012-9, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    2. Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Der blinde Fleck der Change-Management-Literatur: Wie Hold-Up-Probleme den organisatorischen Wandlungsprozess blockieren können," Discussion Papers 2012-10, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    3. Harvey James & Derek Johnson, 2002. "Why Are There Explicit Contracts of Employment?," Law and Economics 0202001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
    6. Bryan Hong & Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang, 2015. "Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay," NBER Working Papers 20845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/175947, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Elisa Gerten & Michael Beckmann & Elisa Gerten & Matthias Kräkel, 2022. "Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 189, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    9. Jed De Varo & Suraj Prasad, 2015. "The Relationship between Delegation and Incentives Across Occupations: Evidence and Theory," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 279-312, June.
    10. Bester, Helmut, 2002. "Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 3276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique M., 2006. "Governance: Who controls matters," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-053, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    12. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 231-263, November.
    13. Greer K. Gosnell & John A. List & Robert Metcalfe, 2016. "A New Approach to an Age-Old Problem: Solving Externalities by Incenting Workers Directly," NBER Working Papers 22316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2008. "Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 565-585, June.
    15. Robert Gibbons, 2010. "Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 337-365, September.
    16. Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Governance: Who Controls Matters," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-053, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    17. Malcomson James M, 2009. "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36, May.
    18. Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer, 2008. "Delegation and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 664-682, September.
    19. Juan D. Carrillo & Mathias Dewatripont, 2008. "Promises, Promises, ..," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1453-1473, August.
    20. Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Tale of Two Wages: Separating Contract from Governance," Microeconomics 9705001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Christian Zehnder & Holger Herz & Jean-Philippe Bonardi, 2016. "A Productive Clash of Cultures: Injecting Economics into Leadership Research," CESifo Working Paper Series 6175, CESifo.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:201219. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wwhalde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.