IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/itsb24/302463.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Using spectrum set-asides to address distributional objectives: lessons from Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Howell, Bronwyn
  • Potgieter, Petrus H.

Abstract

This paper critically examines the effectiveness of spectrum set-asides as a policy tool to address distributional objectives in telecommunications across four diverse national contexts: Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States. Spectrum allocation is a crucial factor for the provision of telecommunications services and by extension, for citizens' participation in the digital economy. While economic theory supports auction-based allocations to maximize market efficiency, set-asides aim to facilitate access for disadvantaged groups or to stimulate competition. This study employs case studies from the selected countries to evaluate the impact of these set-asides on market efficiency, competition, and economic development. In Canada, set-asides intended to encourage new market entrants have led to higher spectrum costs and inefficiencies due to speculative behaviour. In New Zealand, allocations to the indigenous M¯aori population have raised concerns over long-term sector efficiency and capital accessibility. South Africa's policy mandates spectrum allocations to entities with significant ownership by historically disadvantaged persons, with mixed outcomes on market dynamics and social equity. Meanwhile, the United States' approach includes grants rather than direct spectrum set-asides, offering a potentially less distortive model. The findings suggest that while set-asides can support social objectives, they often introduce inefficiencies and fail to achieve the desired economic outcomes. The paper concludes by discussing the implications for future spectrum policy, advocating for careful consideration of the trade-offs between equity and efficiency in spectrum management.

Suggested Citation

  • Howell, Bronwyn & Potgieter, Petrus H., 2024. "Using spectrum set-asides to address distributional objectives: lessons from Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States," 24th ITS Biennial Conference, Seoul 2024. New bottles for new wine: digital transformation demands new policies and strategies 302463, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itsb24:302463
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/302463/1/ITS-Seoul-2024-paper-017.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Darrah Blackwater & Ilia Murtazashvili & Martin B. H. Weiss, 2024. "Polycentric systems for spectrum management: the case of Indigenous and tribal spectrum sovereignty," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 465-491, June.
    2. Claudine Neethling, 2009. "Pricing radio frequency spectrum in South Africa," Journal of Advances in Management Research, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 6(2), pages 172-187, August.
    3. Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 167-188.
    4. Cambini, Carlo & Garelli, Nicola, 2017. "Spectrum fees and market performance: A quantitative analysis," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 355-366.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Choi, Yong-Jae, 2022. "Spectrum auctions in a thin market: The Korean case," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(8).
    2. Howell, Bronwyn & Tang, Xin, 2023. "Using spectrum allocations to address indigenous rights claims: The case of New Zealand," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(10).
    3. Randall Berry & Michael Honig & Thành Nguyen & Vijay Subramanian & Rakesh Vohra, 2020. "The Value of Sharing Intermittent Spectrum," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5242-5264, November.
    4. Mochon, Asuncion & Saez, Yago, 2017. "A review of radio spectrum combinatorial clock auctions," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 303-324.
    5. Kasberger, Bernhard, 2023. "When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    6. Srinuan, Pratompong & Phansatarn, Thunwar & Srinuan, Chalita, 2018. "Spectrum cap and firms' performance: Thailand's experience," 22nd ITS Biennial Conference, Seoul 2018. Beyond the boundaries: Challenges for business, policy and society 190401, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    7. Gary Madden & Erik Bohlin & Thien Tran & Aaron Morey, 2014. "Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(3), pages 277-298, May.
    8. Srinuan, Chalita & Srinuan, Pratompong, 2021. "Determining spectrum caps and service efficiency: A case study of mobile operators in Thailand," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(10).
    9. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2017. "Allocating essential inputs," TSE Working Papers 17-820, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2019.
    10. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
    11. Massaro, Maria & Beltrán, Fernando, 2020. "Will 5G lead to more spectrum sharing? Discussing recent developments of the LSA and the CBRS spectrum sharing frameworks," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(7).
    12. Kuś, Agnieszka & Massaro, Maria, 2022. "Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(4).
    13. Bahia, Kalvin & Castells, Pau, 2022. "The impact of spectrum assignment policies on consumer welfare," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(1).
    14. Wang Tao & Wang Ruqu, 2018. "Limited Liability and High Bids in English Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-12, July.
    15. Gary Madden & Erik Bohlin & Paitoon Kraipornsak & Thien Tran, 2014. "The determinants of prices in the FCC's 700 MHz spectrum auction," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(17), pages 1953-1960, June.
    16. Pantelis Koutroumpis & Martin Cave, 2018. "Auction design and auction outcomes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 275-297, June.
    17. Agnieszka Kus, 2023. "Do the High Spectrum Prices Harm Consumers? Evidence from Poland," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 415-437.
    18. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    19. Sridhar, V. & Prasad, Rohit, 2021. "Analysis of spectrum pricing for commercial mobile services: A cross country study," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(9).
    20. Beltrán, Fernando & Massaro, Maria, 2018. "Spectrum management for 5G: assignment methods for spectrum sharing," 29th European Regional ITS Conference, Trento 2018 184932, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:itsb24:302463. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.itsworld.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.