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Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management

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  • Kuś, Agnieszka
  • Massaro, Maria

Abstract

This paper offers a detailed analysis of selected regulatory parameters used as instruments to promote efficiency with fairness for all stakeholders (in the legal sense of equity) in 5G spectrum auctions. Data were collected from sixteen auctions for the C-band that took place in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2017 and 2020 for the introduction of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology. The selected instruments of intervention are: spectrum packaging, spectrum caps, set-asides, geographical scope of the license, license duration, various forms of license obligations, reserve prices and auction format.

Suggested Citation

  • Kuś, Agnieszka & Massaro, Maria, 2022. "Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(4).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:46:y:2022:i:4:s0308596121001907
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2021.102286
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Darrah Blackwater & Ilia Murtazashvili & Martin B. H. Weiss, 2024. "Polycentric systems for spectrum management: the case of Indigenous and tribal spectrum sovereignty," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 465-491, June.
    2. Parcu, Pier Luigi & Pisarkiewicz, Anna Renata & Carrozza, Chiara & Innocenti, Niccolò, 2023. "The future of 5G and beyond: Leadership, deployment and European policies," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(9).

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