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Wie privatisieren und wer privatisiert? Zur Erklärung der Wahl der Privatisierungsmethode und -organisation

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  • Siegmund, Uwe

Abstract

Mit diesem theoretischen Überblick wird die These vertreten, daß sowohl die Methode als auch die Organisation der Privatisierung aus polit-ökonomischen Erwägungen von den jeweiligen Politikern ausgewählt bzw. strukturiert wird, und nicht aus transaktionskostenökonomischen oder ideologischen Erwägungen. Es wird diejenige Privatisierungsmethode (Versteigerung, Verhandlung, Verschenkung) gewählt, die den Politikern den Machterhalt sichert. Und es wird die Privatisierungsorganisation so strukturiert, daß sie der Stärke und Struktur des jeweiligen Rechtsstaates entspricht.

Suggested Citation

  • Siegmund, Uwe, 1997. "Wie privatisieren und wer privatisiert? Zur Erklärung der Wahl der Privatisierungsmethode und -organisation," Kiel Working Papers 812, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:812
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, . "Methods of privatization: Auctions, bargaining, and giveaways," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    2. Umbeck, John, 1981. "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 38-59, January.
    3. Schmieding, Holger & Koop, Michael J., 1991. "Privatisierung in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Konzepte für den Hindernislauf zur Marktwirtschaft," Kiel Discussion Papers 165, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Heinrich, Ralph P., 1993. "The merits of insider privatization: What Russia can learn from Eastern Central Europe," Kiel Discussion Papers 201, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Schmieding, Holger, 1991. "From socialism to an institutional void: Notes on the nature of the transformation crisis," Kiel Working Papers 480, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Siegmund, Uwe, 1997. "Warum Privatisierung? Eine Dogmengeschichte der Privatisierungstheorien," Kiel Working Papers 785, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatisierung; Privatisierungsmethode; Privatisierungsorganisation; Privatization; Method of Privatization; Agency of Privatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General

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