IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ifwkwp/785.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Warum Privatisierung? Eine Dogmengeschichte der Privatisierungstheorien

Author

Listed:
  • Siegmund, Uwe

Abstract

Jüngste wirtschaftspolitische Auffassungen zur Systemtransformation und institutionentheoretische Argumentationen haben zur These Privatization does not matter gefuhrt. In einer ersten Dogmengeschichte der Privatisierungstheorien wird dieser These wiedersprochen. Alle behandelten Theorien - die Österreichische Schule (1920-40), die Ordnungstheorie (1930-50), die Konzeption des Volkskapitalismus (1950-70), die Theorie der Verfügungsrechte (1960-80), die Theorie der Weichen Budgetbeschränkungen (seit 1980) und Prinzipal-Agenten-Privatisierungstheorien (seit 1990) - sehen die Notwendigkeit der Privatisierung letztendlich in der Entpolitisierung einer Wirtschaft.

Suggested Citation

  • Siegmund, Uwe, 1997. "Warum Privatisierung? Eine Dogmengeschichte der Privatisierungstheorien," Kiel Working Papers 785, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:785
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/46899/1/257867406.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    2. repec:bla:ecorec:v:62:y:1986:i:177:p:145-62 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Simon Domberger & John Piggott, 1986. "Privatization Policies and Public Enterprise: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 62(2), pages 145-162, June.
    4. Schmidt Klaus M. & Schnitzer Monika, 1993. "Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 264-287, June.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
    6. Rothenberg, Lawrence S., 1988. "Braking the Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and the Politics of Policy Reform. By Dorothy Robyn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. ix, 295p. $24.95)," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 302-303, March.
    7. repec:bla:kyklos:v:42:y:1989:i:3:p:319-45 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Robert Millward, 1982. "The Comparative Performance of Public and Private Ownership," Palgrave Macmillan Books,, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. Barry C. Field, 1989. "The Evolution of Property Rights," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 319-345, August.
    10. Umbeck, John, 1981. "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 38-59, January.
    11. Cento G. Veljanovski, 1982. "The Coase Theorems And The Economic Theory Of Markets And Law," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 53-74, February.
    12. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766.
    13. Demsetz, Harold, 1982. "Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 47-57, March.
    14. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, October.
    15. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    16. Siegmund, Uwe, 1996. "Are there nationalization-privatization cycles? A theoretical survey and first empirical evidence," Kiel Working Papers 757, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    17. Sam Peltzman, 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 1-59.
    18. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, April.
    19. Shapiro, C. & Willing, D.R., 1990. "Economic Rationales For The Scope Of Privatization," Papers 41, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Siegmund, Uwe, 1997. "Wie privatisieren und wer privatisiert? Zur Erklärung der Wahl der Privatisierungsmethode und -organisation," Kiel Working Papers 812, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Siegmund, Uwe, 1996. "Are there nationalization-privatization cycles? A theoretical survey and first empirical evidence," Kiel Working Papers 757, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Mühlenkamp, Holger, 2013. "From state to market revisited: more empirical evidence on the efficiency of public (and privately-owned) enterprises," MPRA Paper 47570, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Villalonga, Belen, 2000. "Privatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 43-74, May.
    4. Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Opportunistic Behavior and Legal Disputes in the Chilean Electricity Sector," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv130, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    5. Alberto Cavaliere & Simona Scabrosetti, 2008. "Privatization And Efficiency: From Principals And Agents To Political Economy," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 685-710, September.
    6. Dyck, I. J. Alexander & Wruck, Karen Hopper, 1998. "Organization structure, contract design and government ownership: A clinical analysis of German privatization1," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 265-299, September.
    7. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
    8. Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Didier Laussel, 2020. "A voting model of privatization," Working Papers hal-02504990, HAL.
    9. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, October.
    10. Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Alternative Institutional Arrangements in Network Utilities: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv116, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    11. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, September.
    12. Lahmandi-Ayed, Rim & Laussel, Didier, 2022. "When do privatizations have popular support? A voting model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    13. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 258-268, April.
    14. Asaftei, Gabriel & Kumbhakar, Subal C. & Mantescu, Dorin, 2008. "Ownership, business environment and productivity change," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 498-509, September.
    15. Mark A. Moore & Aidan R. Vining, 2023. "PPP performance evaluation: the social welfare goal, principal–agent theory and political economy," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 56(2), pages 267-299, June.
    16. Kira Boerner, 2004. "The Political Economy of Privatization: Why Do Governments Want Reforms?," Working Papers 2004.106, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    17. Dobryanskaya, Tatyana Yuryevna, 1999. "The choice of ownership structure in transition economies: incomplete contract approach," ISU General Staff Papers 1999010108000017644, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Willner, Johan & Parker, David, 2002. "The Relative Performance of Public and Private Enterprise Under Conditions of Active and Passive Ownership," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30591, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    19. Kevin Cullinane & Dong-Wook Song, 2003. "A stochastic frontier model of the productive efficiency of Korean container terminals," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(3), pages 251-267.
    20. Yurii Perevalov & Ilya Gimadii & Vladimir Dobrodei, 2000. "Does Privatisation Improve Performance of Industrial Enterprises? Empirical Evidence from Russia," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 337-363.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatisierung; Privateigentum; Dogmengeschichte;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:785. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwkiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.