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The impact of sovereign intertemporal trade and cross-default clauses on the sustainability and efficiency of environmental treaties

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  • Mohr, Ernst

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  • Mohr, Ernst, 1992. "The impact of sovereign intertemporal trade and cross-default clauses on the sustainability and efficiency of environmental treaties," Kiel Working Papers 522, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:522
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    1. Nordhaus, William D, 1991. "To Slow or Not to Slow: The Economics of the Greenhouse Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 920-937, July.
    2. Buiter, Willem H, 1981. "Time Preference and International Lending and Borrowing in an Overlapping-Generations Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 769-797, August.
    3. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(6), pages 467-467.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    5. James R. Markusen, 1975. "Cooperative Control of International Pollution and Common Property Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(4), pages 618-632.
    6. Daniel Cohen & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Growth and External Debt Under Risk of Debt Repudiation," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 437-472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    8. Heister, Johannes & Klepper, Gernot & Krämer, Hans Rachebald & Michaelis, Peter & Mohr, Ernst & Neu, Axel Dietmar & Schmidt, Rainer & Weichert, Ronald, 1991. "Umweltpolitik mit handelbaren Emissionsrechten: Möglichkeiten zur Verringerung der Kohlendioxid- und Stickoxidemissionen," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 1173, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    9. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
    10. Occhiolini, Michael, 1990. "Debt for nature swaps," Policy Research Working Paper Series 393, The World Bank.
    11. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    12. Aizenman, Joshua, 1989. "Country Risk, Incomplete Information and Taxes on International Borrowing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 147-161, March.
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