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A Sovereign Debt Model with Trade Credit and Reserves

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  • Kohlscheen, Emanuel

    (University of Warwick)

  • O'Connell, Stephen A.

    (Swarthmore College, PA)

Abstract

This paper analyzes sovereign debt in an economy in which the availability of short-term trade credit reduces international trade transaction costs. The model highlights the distinction between gross and net international reserve positions. Borrowed reserves provide net wealth and liquidity services during a negotiation, as long as they are not fully attachable by creditors. Moreover, reserves strengthen the bargaining position of a country by shielding it from a cut-off from short-term trade credits thereby diminishing its degree of impatience to conclude a negotiation. We show that competitive banks do lend for the accumulation of borrowed reserves, which provide partial insurance

Suggested Citation

  • Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O'Connell, Stephen A., 2006. "A Sovereign Debt Model with Trade Credit and Reserves," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 743, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:743
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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    2. Amrita Dhillon & Javier García‐Fronti & Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2006. "Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery: Analysing the Argentine Swap," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 377-398, April.
    3. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    4. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2010. "Sovereign risk: constitutions rule," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 62-85, January.
    5. Enrique G. Mendoza & Vivian Z. Yue, 2012. "A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(2), pages 889-946.
    6. Antonio Francisco A. Silva Jr, 2011. "The Self-insurance Role of International Reserves and the 2008-2010 Crisis," Working Papers Series 256, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    7. Miller, Marcus & García-Fronti, Javier, 2005. "Credit Crunch and Keynesian Contraction: Argentina in Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 4889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2013. "On the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 649-667, WINTER.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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