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The design of liability rules for highly risky activities: Is strict liability the better solution?

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  • Nell, Martin
  • Richter, Andreas

Abstract

Strict liability is widely seen as the most suitable way to govern highly risky activities, such as environmentally dangerous production or genetic engineering. The reason which is usually given for applying strict liability to these areas, is that not only efficient care is supposed to be induced but also an efficient level of the risky activity itself. It is argued that, in case of no market relationship between injurers and victims, this could only be achieved through strict liability but not via the negligence rule. In this paper we show that the superiority of strict liability does no longer persist in a world of risk averse parties. Our results suggest that in terms of risk allocation the negligence rule should be preferred for abnormally risky activities, if insurance markets are imperfect. The reason is that highly risky activities typically affect a large number of individuals, such that strict liability implies a quite unfavorable allocation of risk. Therefore the negligence rule turns out to be superior, if a market relationship between the parties exists, since it incurs less cost of risk. If there is no market relationship between injurer and victims, no clear result can be derived. The paper concludes with some remarks on the usefulness of upper bounds to an injurer's liability as well as regulations that exclude liability for unforeseeable losses. We argue that this kind of supplement to a strict liability rule can improve efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Nell, Martin & Richter, Andreas, 2001. "The design of liability rules for highly risky activities: Is strict liability the better solution?," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 1, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin F. Grace & Michael J. Rebello, 1993. "Financing and the Demand for Corporate Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(2), pages 147-171, December.
    2. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1995. "Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 189-208, January.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics

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