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Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South America

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  • Flemes, Daniel
  • Wehner, Leslie

Abstract

The politics of contestation on the part of secondary regional powers such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela towards Brazil as the regional leader oscillate between competition and cooperation, inasmuch as the South American region has one regional power and is a zone of negative peace without aggressive rivalries. The secondary powers use different tactics, which constitute their respective foreign policy strategies, to soft balance Brazil. These tactics include alliance building, entangling diplomacy, binding, and omnienmeshment. This paper identifies, first, the specific drivers of contestation towards Brazil and, second, why the secondary powers' foreign policy strategies vary in how they directly or indirectly contest the rise of Brazil at the regional and international levels. The paper demonstrates that in a regional order such as that of South America, which is characterized by relative stability, domestic drivers of contestation are key to explaining secondary powers' varied strategic responses to the regional power.

Suggested Citation

  • Flemes, Daniel & Wehner, Leslie, 2012. "Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South America," GIGA Working Papers 207, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gigawp:207
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Greenfield Partem, 1983. "The Buffer System in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(1), pages 3-26, March.
    2. Ehrlich, Sean D., 2007. "Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 571-605, July.
    3. Cameron G. Thies, 2008. "The Construction of a Latin American Interstate Culture of Rivalry," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(3), pages 231-257, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gisela da Silva Guevara, 2018. "Brasil y sus vecinos, estrategias de Smart Power (2003-2014)," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales, number 126, April.

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