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Winners and Losers in EU State Aid Policy

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  • Nikolaos Zahariadis

Abstract

Who gains and who loses from the European Union’s state aid policy? Using data published by the Competition Directorate from 1992 to 2007, I employ pooled time series analysis to understand the motives behind state aid allocations and then interpret the findings in light of the political relationship between Member States and the Commission. Demand for aid is shaped by national macroeconomic and institutional characteristics. Governments then bargain with the Commission to allocate aid. As a result, the Commission finds itself in a delicate balancing act as controller of state aids and as an institution subject to the political power of member government. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolaos Zahariadis, 2013. "Winners and Losers in EU State Aid Policy," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 143-158, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:13:y:2013:i:1:p:143-158
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-012-0143-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Schito, 2021. "A Sectoral Approach to the Politics of State Aid in the European Union: an Analysis of the European Automotive Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-31, March.
    2. Ruud van Druenen & Pieter Zwaan & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2022. "Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission: Explaining the Duration of Preliminary Investigations in the State Aid Notification Procedure," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 545-561, May.
    3. Daniel Finke, 2020. "At loggerheads over state aid: Why the Commission rejects aid and governments comply," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 474-496, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    state aid policy; European Union; political institutions; C23; P16; L5; O52;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe

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