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Whom do European corporations lobby? The domestic institutional determinants of interest group activity in the European Union

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  • Ehrlich Sean D.
  • Jones Eryn

    (Florida State University – Political Science, Tallahassee, FL, USA)

Abstract

The complicated and multi-layered policymaking process in the European Union presents private interests, such as business firms, with an interesting strategic choice of whom and how to lobby. As the costs of lobbying at the domestic level increase, firms are expected to, instead, devote their resources to lobbying at the European level. Specifically, this article examines how domestic access points and domestic partisanship affect the costs and benefits of lobbying at the domestic versus European level. Using data on firm-level decisions to lobby the EU, this research finds that in countries where is it more costly (or less beneficial) to lobby domestically, firms are more likely to lobby at the EU level.

Suggested Citation

  • Ehrlich Sean D. & Jones Eryn, 2016. "Whom do European corporations lobby? The domestic institutional determinants of interest group activity in the European Union," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 467-488, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:18:y:2016:i:4:p:467-488:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/bap-2015-0039
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Drope Jeffrey M & Hansen Wendy L, 2006. "Does Firm Size Matter? Analyzing Business Lobbying in the United States," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-19, August.
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    5. Lowery David & Gray Virginia & Cluverius John, 2013. "Economic change and the supply of interest representation in the American States," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 33-61, April.
    6. Ehrlich, Sean D., 2011. "Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199737543.
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