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Central Bank Capital as an Instrument of Monetary Policy

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  • Hampl, Mojmir
  • Havranek, Tomas

Abstract

We examine the use of central bank capital as an unconventional monetary policy tool. In this setting, a central bank employs digital currency to transfer digital cash to each household, thus supporting consumption directly when needed. The asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet remains unchanged, and the creation of new digital cash is offset by a decrease in central bank capital. The central bank thus incurs an immediate loss but does not take on any additional risks for its future income statements. We address several objections to this policy, paying particular attention to the claim that weakening the financial strength of the central bank endangers long-term price stability. Through a meta-analysis of 176 estimates reported previously in the literature, we find that central bank financial strength has not historically correlated with inflation performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Hampl, Mojmir & Havranek, Tomas, 2018. "Central Bank Capital as an Instrument of Monetary Policy," EconStor Preprints 176828, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:176828
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    Cited by:

    1. Jack Meaning & Ben Dyson & James Barker & Emily Clayton, 2021. "Broadening Narrow Money: Monetary Policy with a Central Bank Digital Currency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(2), pages 1-42, June.
    2. Sascha Buetzer, 2022. "Advancing the Monetary Policy Toolkit through Outright Transfers," IMF Working Papers 2022/087, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Discussion Paper Series 208, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank capital; inflation; seigniorage; monetary policy; helicopter money; central bank digital currency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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