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How Central Should the Central Bank Be?

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Listed:
  • Alan S. Blinder

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

About six years ago, I published a small book entitled The Quiet Revolution (Blinder 2004). Though its subtitle was Central Banking Goes Modern, I never imagined the half of it. Since March 2008, the Federal Reserve has gone post-modern with a bewildering variety of unprecedented actions that have either changed the nature and scope of the central bank?s role or stretched it beyond the breaking point, depending on your point of view. And that leads straight to the central question of this essay: What should--and shouldn?t--the Federal Reserve do?

Suggested Citation

  • Alan S. Blinder, 2010. "How Central Should the Central Bank Be?," Working Papers 1202, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:cepsud:198
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mishkin, F S., 2008. "How should we respond to asset price bubbles?," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 12, pages 65-74, October.
    2. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1999. "How should monetary policy be conducted in an era of price stability?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 195-259.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 351-429.
    4. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    5. Rudebusch, Glenn D., 2002. "Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1161-1187, September.
    6. Alan S. Blinder, 2010. "How Central Should the Central Bank Be?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 123-133, March.
    7. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph M. Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trips It's Been," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(2), pages 55-218.
    8. Alan S. Blinder, 2010. "How Central Should the Central Bank Be?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 123-133, March.
    9. Alan S. Blinder, 2006. "Monetary Policy Today: Sixteen Questions and about Twelve Answers," Working Papers 73, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal reserve bank; monetary policy; central bank;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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