Effects of third party errors
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DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2529026
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More about this item
Keywords
types-I&II errors; institutions; rules enforcement; rules enactment; discrimination; Nash equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
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