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Leniency programs in the presence of judicial errors

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  • Ghebrihiwet, N.
  • Motchenkova, E.I.

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  • Ghebrihiwet, N. & Motchenkova, E.I., 2010. "Leniency programs in the presence of judicial errors," Serie Research Memoranda 0008, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    • Handle: RePEc:vua:wpaper:2010-8
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    1. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    2. Joseph E. Harrington, 2008. "Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 215-246, June.
    3. Kalok Chan & Albert J. Menkveld & Zhishu Yang, 2008. "Information Asymmetry and Asset Prices: Evidence from the China Foreign Share Discount," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(1), pages 159-196, February.
    4. Png, I. P. L., 1986. "Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 101-105, June.
    5. Schinkel, Maarten Pieter & Tuinstra, Jan, 2006. "Imperfect competition law enforcement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1267-1297, November.
    6. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    8. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1996. "Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 191-210, April.
    9. Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability," Other publications TiSEM d6321c1e-b79a-4aae-8ef5-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Menkveld, Albert J., 2008. "Splitting orders in overlapping markets: A study of cross-listed stocks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 145-174, April.
    11. Easterbrook, Frank H & Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1980. "Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 331-370, October.
    12. Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2008. "Judicial Errors and Innovative Activity," Working Papers 337, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    13. Chan, Kalok & Menkveld, Albert J. & Yang, Zhishu, 2006. "Are Domestic Investors Better Informed than Foreign Investors? : Evidence from the Perfectly Segmented Market in China," Serie Research Memoranda 0004, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    14. Nathan H. Miller, 2009. "Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 750-768, June.
    15. William M. Landes, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 164-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Verhagen, Tibert & Meents, Selmar & Tan, Yao-Hua, 2006. "Perceived risk and trust associated with purchasing at Electronic Marketplaces," Serie Research Memoranda 0001, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    17. Bruce H. Kobayashi, 1992. "Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for "Unfair" Plea Bargains," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 507-517, Winter.
    18. Kaplow, Louis, 1994. "The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 307-401, January.
    19. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, April.
    20. Kobayashi, Bruce H. & Lott, John Jr., 1996. "In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 397-416, December.
    21. Agterberg, M. & Hooff, B. van den & Huysman, M., 2008. "Keeping the wheels turning : multi-level dynamics in organizing networks of practice," Serie Research Memoranda 0003, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    22. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-757, September.
    23. Agterberg, M. & Huysman, M. & Hooff, B. van den, 2008. "Leadership in online knowledge networks : challenges and coping strategies in a network of practice," Serie Research Memoranda 0004, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    24. Verhagen. T. & Feldberg, F. & Hooff, B. van den, 2008. "Explaining user adoption of virtual worlds: towards a multipurpose Explaining user adoption of virtual worlds: towards a multipurpose motivational model," Serie Research Memoranda 0006, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Natalia Pavlova & Andrey Shastitko, 2014. "Effects Of Hostility Tradition In Antitrust: Leniency Programs And Cooperation Agreements," HSE Working papers WP BRP 58/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Pavlova, Natalia & Shastitko, Andrey, 2016. "Leniency programs and socially beneficial cooperation: Effects of type I errors," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 375-401.
    3. Šastitko, Andrej E., 2013. "Effects of third party errors," EconStor Preprints 121747, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    4. Shastitko, Andrey, 2014. "Effects of the Third Party Errors," Published Papers re9021, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    5. Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Shastitko, Andrey (Шаститко, Андрей) & Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья), 2015. "Program for Smoothening Punishment for Participating in a Cartel: The Problematic Field, and the Effects of Structural Alternatives [Программа Ослабления Наказания За Участие В Картеле: Проблемное ," Published Papers mn32, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    7. Peter T. Dijkstra & Jacob Seifert, 2023. "Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 239-273, September.

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