Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(2), pages 169-169.
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Heiner, Ronald A, 1985. "Origin of Predictable Behavior: Further Modeling and Applications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 391-396, May.
- Kirstein, Roland, 2002.
"The new Basle Accord, internal ratings, and the incentives of banks,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 393-412, May.
- Kirstein, Roland, 2000. "The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Al Slivinski, 2002. "Team Incentives and Organizational Form," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 185-206, April.
- Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992.
"Peer Pressure and Partnerships,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
- Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Daniel S. Nagin & James B. Rebitzer & Seth Sanders & Lowell J. Taylor, 2002.
"Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 850-873, September.
- Daniel Nagin & James Rebitzer & Seth Sanders & Lowell Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 8811, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ronald Heiner, 1990. "Rule-governed behavior in evolution and human society," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, December.
- Kessler, Anke S., 2000. "On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 280-291, April.
- Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
- Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
- Langlois,Richard, 1989. "Economics as a Process," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521378598, January.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024.
"Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1589-1646, December.
- Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Michael Waldman, 2012.
"Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lucija Muehlenbachs & Stefan Staubli & Mark A. Cohen, 2016.
"The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence,"
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 159-204.
- Muehlenbachs, Lucija Anna & Staubli, Stefan & Cohen, Mark A., 2013. "The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence," RFF Working Paper Series dp-13-36-rev2, Resources for the Future.
- Gershkov, Alex & Li, Jianpei & Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Collective Production and Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 186, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Matsuzawa, Satoshi, 2024. "Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
- Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2009. "Efficient tournaments within teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 103-119, March.
- Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2006.
"Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-499, December.
- Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2005. "Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0205, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
- Özgür Kıbrıs & Arzu Kıbrıs, 2016. "On surplus-sharing in partnerships," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 89-111, June.
- Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
- Arjona Trujillo, Ana María, 2002. "La corrupción política: una revisión de la literatura," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. EconomÃa. DE de021404, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Arrunada, Benito & Paz-Ares, Candido, 1997. "Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 31-61, March.
- MARTIN Ludivine, 2007.
"The impact of technological changes on incentives and motivations to work hard,"
IRISS Working Paper Series
2007-15, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD.
- Ludivine Martin, 2008. "The impact of technological changes on incentives and motivations to work hard," Post-Print halshs-00325881, HAL.
- Marcel Boyer & Tracy R. Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 2000.
"Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(2), pages 319-340, May.
- Marcel Boyer & Tracy R. Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 2000. "Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(2), pages 319-340, May.
- Marcel Boyer & Tracy R. Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 1996. "Setting Standards for Credible Compliance and Law Enforcement," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-27, CIRANO.
- Witte, Kristof De & Geys, Benny, 2011.
"Evaluating efficient public good provision: Theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries,"
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 319-327, May.
- De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny, 2010. "Evaluating efficient public good provision: Theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-14, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brandts, Jordi & Corgnet, Brice & Hernán-González, Roberto & Ortiz, José Mª & Solà, Carles, 2021.
"Watching or not watching? Access to information and the incentive effects of firing threats,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 672-685.
- José M. Ortiz & Roberto Hernán-González & Brice Corgnet & Carles Solà & Jordi Brandts, 2018. "Watching or Not Watching? Access to Information and the Incentive Effects of Firing Threats," Working Papers 1023, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ding, Wenzhi & Levine, Ross & Lin, Chen & Xie, Wensi, 2021.
"Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 802-830.
- Wenzhi Ding & Ross Levine & Chen Lin & Wensi Xie, 2020. "Corporate Immunity to the COVID-19 Pandemic," NBER Working Papers 27055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bejarano, Hernán & Corgnet, Brice & Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín, 2021. "Economic stability promotes gift-exchange in the workplace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 374-398.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
- Derek C. Jones & Takao Kato, 2011.
"The Impact of Teams on Output, Quality, and Downtime: An Empirical Analysis Using Individual Panel Data,"
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 64(2), pages 215-240, January.
- Jones, Derek C. & Kato, Takao, 2007. "The Impact of Teams on Output, Quality and Downtime: An Empirical Analysis Using Individual Panel Data," IZA Discussion Papers 2917, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jones, Derek & Kato, Takao, 2007. "The Impact of Teams on Output, Quality and Downtime: An Empirical Analysis Using Individual Panel Data," Working Papers 104-24, Department of Economics, Colgate University.
More about this item
Keywords
Hierarchy; Imperfect Diagnosis; Monitoring; Incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fosaade.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.