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Kündigungsschutzrecht in den USA und in Deutschland: ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Rechtsvergleichung

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  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Kittner, Michael
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

Der Beitrag plädiert für die Verwendung der ökonomischen Analyse als Methode der Rechtsvergleichung. Mit ihrer Hilfe wird gezeigt, daß das Vorurteil unbegründet ist, der Kündigungsschutz sei in den USA ?schwächer? (arbeitgeberfreundlicher) als in Deutschland. Die erwartete Abfindungszahlung kann in beiden Rechtssystemen durchaus gleich hoch ausfallen (in Deutschland ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Abfindung höher, in den USA die Höhe der Zahlung). Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse zeigt darüber hinaus, daß die Beteiligung des Betriebsrates an Kündigungen in Deutschland opportunistisches Verhalten der Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer einzudämmen hilft. Diese Art der Sicherung spezifischer Investitionen in Humankapital könnte zur Erklärung des empirischen Befundes beitragen, daß in Deutschland die Arbeitsproduktivität i.a. höher ist als in den USA.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirstein, Roland & Kittner, Michael & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2000. "Kündigungsschutzrecht in den USA und in Deutschland: ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Rechtsvergleichung," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-08, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200008
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pfeifer, Christian, 2004. "Fairness und Kündigungen : eine theoretische und empirische Analyse (Fairness and layoffs * a theoretical and empirical analysis)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 37(2), pages 127-145.
    2. Wernhard Möschel & Heinz Lampert & Michael Schneider, 2005. "Wozu (heute noch) Gewerkschaften, Tarifautonomie und Flächentarifverträge?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 58(02), pages 03-15, January.
    3. Eger, Thomas, 2003. "Opportunistic termination of employment contracts and legal protection against dismissal in Germany and the USA," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 381-403, December.
    4. Pfeifer, Christian, 2004. "Fairness und Kündigungen : eine theoretische und empirische Analyse (Fairness and layoffs * a theoretical and empirical analysis)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 37(2), pages 127-145.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arbeitsvertrag; Betriebsrat; Quasirenten; spezifische Investitionen; Humankapital; economic comparison of law; termination of labor contracts; quasirents; human capital; specific investments workers' council;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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