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The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities

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  • Kirstein, Roland

Abstract

The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of the theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirstein, Roland, 2006. "The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200603
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Group decisions; judicial; imperfect decision-making;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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