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Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrechts in Europa - eine Lösung auf der Suche nach dem Problem? Die Sicht der Neuen Institutionenökonomik

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  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

It is the purpose of the paper to shed light on the question to what extent there is a need for a unified contract law in the European Union. The paper outlines a concept of constitutional uncertainty in international trade and presents a model of international transactions in the presence of a diversity of legal orders and the territoriality of law. The model is used to identify the problems emerging in contracts and the contracting process due to factors such as the multitude of legal orders and the territoriality of law. Next, the economic arguments in favour of and against harmonisation are discussed. In weighing up the costs that full harmonisation generates against the costs of constitutional uncertainty the paper considers the arguments in favour of the diversity of law to be stronger from an efficiency point of view. The paper makes a plea for freedom of choice of contract law and a free movement of judgements in the European Union. Both conditions are necessary and sufficient for a proper functioning of the internal market – but, as a matter of fact, both conditions are already met.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2007. "Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrechts in Europa - eine Lösung auf der Suche nach dem Problem? Die Sicht der Neuen Institutionenökonomik," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2007-01, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200701
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23090/1/2007-01_vereinheitlichung.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schnitzer, Monika, 1997. "Debt vs. Foreign Direct Investment: The Impact of Sovereign Risk on the Structure of International Capital Flows," CEPR Discussion Papers 1608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December.
    3. repec:bla:econom:v:69:y:2002:i:273:p:41-67 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2000. "Do Artists Benefit from Resale Royalties? An Economic Analysis of a New EU Directive," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    5. Kronman, Anthony T, 1985. "Contract Law and the State of Nature," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 5-32, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    constitutional uncertainty; territoriality of law; harmonisation of law; conflict of law; international private law; transaction costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration

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