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Der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt im Zielkonflikt zwischen fiskalischer Flexibilität und Glaubwürdigkeit: Ein Reformansatz unter Berücksichtigung konstitutionen- und institutionenökonomischer Aspekte

Author

Listed:
  • Ohr, Renate
  • Schmidt, André

Abstract

By applying the concepts of institutional and constitutional economics, this paper addresses the question to what extent a reform of the stability pact will be efficient and appropriate. The starting point of the analysis is the assumption that the stability pact will yield disciplining effects only if it will be credibly applied. Enhancing credibility presupposes that the objectives of the pact are credible themselves and that non-compliance will be contemporarily and strictly sanctioned. The authors conclude that the objectives of the stability pact correspond to the requirements concerning credibility. However, the procedural design of the enforcement mechanism shows substantial deficits. Therefore, an institutional reform of the procedural design following the notion of the separation of powers is proposed, in order to enhance the credibility with respect to the stability pact's enforcement. Suitable institutional mechanisms, which guaranty the compliance with, and the enforcement of, the stability pact, are unalterable prerequisites for transforming the stability pact into an effective disciplining device in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohr, Renate & Schmidt, André, 2003. "Der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt im Zielkonflikt zwischen fiskalischer Flexibilität und Glaubwürdigkeit: Ein Reformansatz unter Berücksichtigung konstitutionen- und institutionenökonomischer Aspekte," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 19, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:19
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Ackrill & Dean Garratt, "undated". "Rules Versus Discretion: Why EMU Needs a Stability Pact," Discussion Papers in European Economics 97/3, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    2. Siebert, Horst, 2002. "Weshalb die Europäische Währungsunion den Stabilitätspakt braucht," Kiel Working Papers 1134, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    4. Wyplosz, Charles, 1991. "Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline," CEPR Discussion Papers 488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herzog, Bodo, 2005. "Why do bigger countries have more problems with the Stability and Growth Pact?," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 40, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:got:cegedp:40 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bodo Herzog, 2004. "Warum verstoßen vorwiegend die großen EWU-Länder gegen den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt?: Eine theoretische Beweisaufnahme," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 405-417.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stabilitätspakt; Europäische Währungsunion; Konstitutionenökonomik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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