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Enforcing Constitutional Constraints

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  • Daniel Sutter

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  • Daniel Sutter, 1997. "Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 139-150, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:8:y:1997:i:2:p:139-150
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009064425503
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. D. Usher & M. Engineer, 1987. "The distribution of income in a despotic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 261-276, August.
    2. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    3. Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-530, June.
    4. Wagner, Richard E, 1993. "The Impending Transformation of Public Choice Scholarship," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 203-212, September.
    5. Sutter, Daniel, 1998. "Constitutions and the growth of government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-142, January.
    6. Tyler Cowen & Amihai Glazer & Henry McMillan, 1994. "Rent Seeking Can Promote The Provision Of Public Goods," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 131-145, July.
    7. Klein, Daniel B., 1994. "If Government is so Villainous, How come Government Officials don't seem like Villains?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 91-106, April.
    8. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, January.
    9. Donald Boudreaux & A. Pritchard, 1994. "Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-21, December.
    10. Lewin, Jeff L. & Trumbull, William N., 1990. "The social value of crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 271-284, December.
    11. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
    12. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    13. Dwight Lee, 1989. "The impossibility of a desirable minimal state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 277-284, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.

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