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ETICA PUBBLICA Ε REGOLE DEL GIOCO. I DOVERI SOCIALI IN UNE SOCIETA LIBERALE: Compte rendu par Jean-Michel Josselin0 et Alain Marciano

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  • Forte Francesco

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  • Forte Francesco, 1996. "ETICA PUBBLICA Ε REGOLE DEL GIOCO. I DOVERI SOCIALI IN UNE SOCIETA LIBERALE: Compte rendu par Jean-Michel Josselin0 et Alain Marciano," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 167-176, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:7:y:1996:i:1:p:10:n:16
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-1996-0116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    2. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    3. Josselin, Jean-Michel & Marciano, Alain, 1995. "Constitutionalism and Common Knowledge: Assessment and Application to a Future European Constitution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(1-2), pages 173-188, October.
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