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Die Europäische Agrarpolitik im Spannungsfeld von Osterweiterung und WTO-Verhandlungen

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  • Henning, Christian H.C.A.
  • Glauben, Thomas
  • Wald, Andreas

Abstract

Der Artikel umfasst eine quantitative polit-ökonomische Analyse aktueller und zukünftiger Reformen der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik unter unterschiedlichen Szenarios einer zukünftigen EU-Osterweiterung und zukünftigen WTO-Verhandlungen. Theoretische Grundlage der Analysen ist ein politisches Tauschmodells von HENNING (2000). Zentrale Ergebnisse der quantitativen Analysen sind: (i) Es lässt sich ein signifikanter Einfluss der Agrarlobby auf die aktuelle und zukünftige Neuformulierung der Agrarpolitik in der EU-15 bzw. erweiterten EU-25 feststellen. (ii) Eine Osterweiterung hätte im Ve rgleich zu verschärften WTO-Restriktionen einen erheblich stärkeren Einfluss auf zukünftige Agrarreformen. Inhaltlich induziert eine Osterweiterung ein deutlich niedrigeres Agrarprotektionsniveau sowie eine geringere Förderung der Multifunktionalität der Landwirtschaft. (iii) Während innerhalb der EU-15 eine qualifizierte Mehrheit für eine entsprechende Agrarreform wäre, würde diese in einer erweiterten EU-25 am "Veto" der osteuropäischen Mitglieder scheitern. Insofern ist das timing der Reform wichtig. (iv) Die Mehrheit der politischen Akteure in der EU-15 bewertet die außenpolitisch induzierten Reformen negativ, während diese aus gesamtgesellschaftlicher Perspektive der EU-15 positiv zu bewerten sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Henning, Christian H.C.A. & Glauben, Thomas & Wald, Andreas, 2000. "Die Europäische Agrarpolitik im Spannungsfeld von Osterweiterung und WTO-Verhandlungen," FE Working Papers 0005, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Food Economics and Consumption Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:caufew:0005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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