IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/envpol/v14y2012i1p23-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How do electoral competition and special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy standards?

Author

Listed:
  • Johannes Urpelainen

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "How do electoral competition and special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy standards?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 23-34, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:14:y:2012:i:1:p:23-34
    DOI: 10.1007/s10018-011-0020-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10018-011-0020-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10018-011-0020-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
    2. Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-131, March.
    3. Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, 2010. "Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 133-158.
    4. Fischer, Carolyn & Newell, Richard G., 2008. "Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 142-162, March.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    6. Kawahara, Shinya, 2011. "Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 477-495, September.
    7. Lipp, Judith, 2007. "Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5481-5495, November.
    8. Wiser, Ryan & Namovicz, Christopher & Gielecki, Mark & Smith, Robert, 2007. "The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 8-20, May.
    9. Unruh, Gregory C., 2000. "Understanding carbon lock-in," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(12), pages 817-830, October.
    10. Laird, Frank N. & Stefes, Christoph, 2009. "The diverging paths of German and United States policies for renewable energy: Sources of difference," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2619-2629, July.
    11. Barry G. Rabe, 2008. "States on Steroids: The Intergovernmental Odyssey of American Climate Policy," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 25(2), pages 105-128, March.
    12. Aidt, T.S.Toke Skovsgaard & Dutta, Jayasri, 2004. "Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 458-479, May.
    13. Campos, Jose Edgardo L, 1989. "Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 333-353, Fall.
    14. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 1, pages 3-21, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    15. Cowan, Robin, 1990. "Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 541-567, September.
    16. Christoph Heinzel & Thomas Winkler, 2011. "Economic functioning and politically pragmatic justification of tradable green certificates in Poland," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(2), pages 157-175, June.
    17. Johannes Urpelainen, 2009. "Explaining the Schwarzenegger Phenomenon: Local Frontrunners in Climate Policy," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 9(3), pages 82-105, August.
    18. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
    2. De Groote, Olivier & Gautier, Axel & Verboven, Frank, 2024. "The political economy of financing climate policy — Evidence from the solar PV subsidy programs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    3. Wang Yuhua, 2015. "Politically connected polluters under smog," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 97-123, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrew Cheon & Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "How do Competing Interest Groups Influence Environmental Policy? The Case of Renewable Electricity in Industrialized Democracies, 1989–2007," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 61(4), pages 874-897, December.
    2. Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "A model of dynamic climate governance: dream big, win small," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 107-125, May.
    3. Zeppini, Paolo, 2015. "A discrete choice model of transitions to sustainable technologies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 187-203.
    4. Nicolli, Francesco & Vona, Francesco, 2019. "Energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in OECD countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 853-867.
    5. Pablo Río & Xavier Labandeira, 2009. "Barriers to the introduction of market-based instruments in climate policies: an integrated theoretical framework," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 41-68, March.
    6. Per Fredriksson, 2001. "How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 65-85, April.
    7. Lehmann, Paul & Gawel, Erik, 2013. "Why should support schemes for renewable electricity complement the EU emissions trading scheme?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 597-607.
    8. Wei Jin & ZhongXiang Zhang, 2015. "Levelling the Playing Field: On the Missing Role of Network Externality in Designing Renewable Energy Technology Deployment Policies," Working Papers 2015.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Paolo Zeppini, 2014. "A discrete choice model of transitions to sustainable technologies: speed limits and optimal monetary policies," Department of Economics Working Papers 28/14, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    10. Pablo Río & Xavier Labandeira, 2009. "Barriers to the introduction of market-based instruments in climate policies: an integrated theoretical framework," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 41-68, March.
    11. Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 145-163, May.
    12. Hötte, Kerstin & Pichler, Anton & Lafond, François, 2021. "The rise of science in low-carbon energy technologies," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    13. Clas Eriksson, 2011. "Home bias in preferences and the political economics of agricultural protection," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 92(1), pages 5-23.
    14. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," Working Papers 2072/151545, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    15. Herche, Wesley, 2017. "Solar energy strategies in the U.S. utility market," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 590-595.
    16. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2003. "Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy: An Interest-Group Approach," NBER Working Papers 9631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Hötte, Kerstin, 2020. "How to accelerate green technology diffusion? Directed technological change in the presence of coevolving absorptive capacity," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    18. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    20. Angus C. Chu, 2008. "Special Interest Politics And Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Analysis Of Strengthening Patent Protection In The Pharmaceutical Industry," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 185-215, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Renewable energy; Special interests; Policy instruments; Game theory; Political economy; L50; Q54; Q58;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:14:y:2012:i:1:p:23-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.