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The Janus Face of Cooperation: An Intra- and Cross-Cultural Review

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  • Walkowitz, Gari
  • Goerg, Sebastian J.

Abstract

This paper introduces a two-sided methodological framework for studies on cooperation based on a new game design. Presented games are continuous prisoner's dilemma games with positive and negative presentations of an identically structured decision problem. Decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given range of possible actions. Within a cross-cultural experimental study involving Palestinian and Israeli subjects we test for a strategic presentation bias applying our framework. Palestinians show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Israel no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings, we argue that cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within cross-cultural research.

Suggested Citation

  • Walkowitz, Gari & Goerg, Sebastian J., 2007. "The Janus Face of Cooperation: An Intra- and Cross-Cultural Review," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 5/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:52007
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    Cited by:

    1. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gächter, Simon & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, 2011. "The framing of games and the psychology of play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 459-478.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperation; presentation of decision problems; framing; methodology; cross-cultural research;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values

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