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Tax avoidance and vertical interlocks within multinational enterprises

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  • Giese, Henning
  • Koch, Reinald
  • Gamm, Markus

Abstract

This study investigates to what extent multinational enterprises appoint managers jointly at the headquarter and a foreign subsidiary (vertical manager interlocks, VMIs) in order to facilitate tax planning. We use a cross-section data set taken from the AMADEUS database to show that VMIs are observed more frequently in MNEs with a higher potential for tax-induced profit shifting. We also provide evidence indicating that the implementation of VMIs is motivated by an internal principal-agent conflict arising from conflicting interests between the MNE and high-tax subsidiary managers. Finally, we show that the use of VMI structures is associated, ceteris paribus, with a lower effective tax rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Giese, Henning & Koch, Reinald & Gamm, Markus, 2022. "Tax avoidance and vertical interlocks within multinational enterprises," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 270, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:arqudp:270
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    management structure; profit shifting; principal-agent-theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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