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Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives

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  • Mihir Desai

    (Harvard Business School)

  • Dhammika Dharmapala

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. The model generates the testable hypothesis that firm governance characteristics determine how incentive compensation changes sheltering decisions. In order to test the model, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that, for the full sample of firms, increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, suggesting a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. As predicted by the model, the relationship between incentive compensation and tax sheltering is a function of a firm.s corporate governance. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the .undersheltering puzzle,. and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, "undated". "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1006, American Law & Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:bep:alecam:1006
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General

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