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Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions

Author

Listed:
  • Yao Cheng
  • Zaifu Yang
  • Jingsheng Yu

Abstract

Multiple positions will be allocated to a group of individuals without side payments. Every individual has preferences over the positions, can have at most one position and may behave strategically. The right of using each position relies on individuals' given priorities. We propose a new solution called the proper exclusion right core which always guarantees to have precisely one solution. The solution is efficient, weakly and properly fair, can be supported by competitive prices and easily found by a procedure in a strategy-proof way. It is built on a novel exclusion right system that respects priorities and maximizes self-consistent exclusion rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2024. "Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions," Discussion Papers 24/01, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:24/01
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu, 2003. "A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 73-79, October.
    2. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 2004. "A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 84-92, May.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Core; proper exclusion right; indivisibility; incentive; top trading cycle.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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