A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
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- Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu, 2017. "A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 346, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
References listed on IDEAS
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