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Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences

Author

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  • Yao Cheng
  • Zaifu Yang

Abstract

This paper considers a general and practical kidney exchange model with compatible or incompatible patient-donor pairs, single donors, and patients on the waiting list. Efficient exchange procedures are proposed with dichotomous preferences in which only one-way, two-way, three, or four-way chains or cycles of exchange are used. We derive a tight upper bound of the possible number of feasible kidney transplants in each case of exchange and provide substantial simulation results. We find that two-way cycles and chains of exchange can substantially increase the number of feasible transplants, threeway can have a visible effect, and at most four-way cycles and chains suffice to capture all potential gains of exchange. Our results are not only theoretically interesting but also have meaningful policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2017. "Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences," Discussion Papers 17/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:17/13
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andersson, Tommy & Kratz, Jörgen, 2016. "Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier," Working Papers 2016:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 29 Nov 2017.
    2. Vulkan, Nir & Roth, Alvin E. & Neeman, Zvika (ed.), 2013. "The Handbook of Market Design," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199570515.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    4. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Thayer Morrill, 2014. "Sequential Kidney Exchange," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 265-285, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cheng, Yao & Yang, Zaifu, 2021. "Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kidney Exchange; Efficiency; Matching; Simulation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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