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Leadership and Motivation for Public Goods Contributions

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  • Bryan C. McCannon

    (West Virginia University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

Results from a leader-follower public goods game are presented. An individual, when randomlyselected to make a contribution knowing that others will observe the selection, gives more than one does in the simultaneous-move public goods game. Followers adopt a quasi-matching strategy where they systematically donate less than the leader, but contribute more when the leader does and contribute less when the leader free rides. The net result is increased provision of a public good when contributions are sequential. The results highlight that psychological preferences, rather than solely social preferences, can explain behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan C. McCannon, 2015. "Leadership and Motivation for Public Goods Contributions," Working Papers 15-24, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-24
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    File URL: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1154&context=econ_working-papers
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Béatrice BOULU-RESHEF & Nina RAPOPORT, "undated". "Voluntary contributions in cascades: The tragedy of ill-informed leadership," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2824, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    2. Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Nina Rapoport, 2020. "Voluntary contributions in cascades: The tragedy of ill-informed leadership," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02977853, HAL.
    3. Gerald Eisenkopf & Torben Kölpin, 2023. "Leadership and cooperation in growing teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 273-299, April.
    4. Caria, A. Stefano & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2019. "Expectations, network centrality, and public good contributions: Experimental evidence from India," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 391-408.
    5. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    6. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2020. "Psychological game theory in public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 159-180, January.
    7. Loerakker, Ben & van Winden, Frans, 2017. "Emotional Leadership in an Intergroup Conflict Game Experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 143-167.
    8. Eichenseer, Michael & Moser, Johannes, 2018. "Leadership in a Dynamic Public Goods Game: An Experimental Study," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181599, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    Keywords

    experiment; leadership; psychological game theory; public goods; social preferences;
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