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Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements

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  • Leech, D.

Abstract

This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, from the perspective of enlargement of the Union. It uses an approach based on power indices due to Penrose, Banzhaf and Coleman to make two analyses: (1) the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness, and (2) the question of how the majority quota required for QMV should be determined.

Suggested Citation

  • Leech, D., 2001. "Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 587, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:587
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp587.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dennis Leech, 2002. "An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, March.
    2. Jan-Erik Lane & Sven Berg, 1999. "Relevance of Voting Power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 309-320, July.
    3. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
    4. Garrett, Geoffrey & Tsebelis, George, 1996. "An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 269-299, April.
    5. Hosli, Madeleine O., 1993. "Admission of European Free Trade Association states to the European Community: effects on voting power in the European Community Council of Ministers," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 629-643, October.
    6. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    7. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    8. Madeleine o. Hosli, 1996. "Coallitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 255-273, June.
    9. Matthias Sutter, 2000. "Fair Allocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU before and after the Next Enlargement," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(4), pages 433-449, October.
    10. Pradeep Dubey & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1979. "Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 99-131, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:44:y:2006:i::p:865-897 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 865-897, December.
    3. Dennis Leech, 2001. "Shareholder Voting Power and Corporate Governance: A Study of Large British Companies," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, pages 33-54.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    VOTING ; QUOTA SYSTEM ; INDEXES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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