IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/applec/v37y2005i10p1147-1156.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration

Author

Listed:
  • Yener Kandogan

Abstract

Power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty is done by applying methods that use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decreases in voting power of small countries make widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to small size of the applicants. Relative increases in the conciliatory power of smaller members, and relative increases in the independent power of bigger members make smaller members compromise more, and improve the position of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis reveals a more federalist EU in the way votes are distributed.

Suggested Citation

  • Yener Kandogan, 2005. "Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1147-1156.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:37:y:2005:i:10:p:1147-1156
    DOI: 10.1080/00036840500109498
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840500109498
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/00036840500109498?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Axel Moberg, 2002. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 259-282, June.
    2. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
    3. Kandogan, Yener, 2000. "Political economy of eastern enlargement of the European Union: Budgetary costs and reforms in voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 685-705, November.
    4. Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1997. "The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament," CEPR Discussion Papers 1600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
    6. Widgren, Mika, 1994. "Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1153-1170, May.
    7. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    8. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    9. Richard E. Baldwin & Joseph F. Francois & Richard Portes, 1997. "The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 125-176.
    10. Madeleine o. Hosli, 1996. "Coallitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 255-273, June.
    11. Guillermo Owen, 1972. "Multilinear Extensions of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 64-79, January.
    12. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-464, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Perkins, Richard & Neumayer, Eric, 2007. "Do membership benefits buy regulatory compliance?: an empirical analysis of EU directives 1978-1999," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3057, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Richard Perkins & Eric Neumayer, 2007. "Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance?," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(2), pages 180-206, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yener Kandogan, 2003. "DEMOCRACY???S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-576, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martınez & Federico Valenciano, 2006. "Success Versus Decisiveness," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 185-205, April.
    3. Widgrén, Mika, 2008. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making," Discussion Papers 1162, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    4. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Zhi WANG & Shangjin WEI & Kei-Mu YI, 2009. "Value Chain in East Asia Production Network -An International Input-output Model Based Analysis," EcoMod2009 21500090, EcoMod.
    6. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 517-538, October.
    7. Mika Widgrén, 2008. "The Impact of Council's Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU," Discussion Papers 26, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    8. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2011. "Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU Council of Ministers: the consultation procedure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 511-541, September.
    9. Napel, Stefan & Widgrén, Mika, 2017. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis: a unified approach," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 345, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    10. D'ora Gr'eta Petr'oczy & L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2023. "Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis," Papers 2312.16878, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    11. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    12. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    13. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
    14. Matthias Weber, 2014. "Choosing Voting Systems behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-042/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
    16. Ibrahima Dia & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "The Voting Power in the Inter-communal Council of Martinique and Guadeloupe [Le Pouvoir de Vote dans les Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe]," Post-Print hal-01631190, HAL.
    17. Peter Roozendaal & Madeleine Hosli & Caspar Heetman, 2012. "Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 447-467, December.
    18. Houy, Nicolas & Zwicker, William S., 2014. "The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 7-16.
    19. Yuto Ushioda & Masato Tanaka & Tomomi Matsui, 2022. "Monte Carlo Methods for the Shapley–Shubik Power Index," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-14, June.
    20. Fabrice Barthelemy & Mathieu Martin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2011. "Some conjectures on the two main power indices," THEMA Working Papers 2011-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:37:y:2005:i:10:p:1147-1156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEC20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.