What is special about the proportion? A research report on special majority voting and the classical Condorcet jury theorem
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Condorcet jury theorem; special majority voting; proportion; decreasing juror competence;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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