The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency
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Other versions of this item:
- Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2003. "The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000057, www.najecon.org.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Sonnenschein, Hugo F., 2003. "The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency," Working Papers 1159, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003.
"An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1441, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2004. "An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods," Microeconomics.ca working papers norman-04-11-21-09-39-13, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 08 Feb 2005.
- Fang,H. & Norman,P., 2003. "An efficiency rationale for bundling of public goods," Working papers 19, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Peter Norman & Hanming Fang, 2004. "An Efficiency Rationale for the Bundling of Public Goods," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 458, Econometric Society.
- Peter Norman, 2004. "An Efficiency Rational for Bundling of Public Goods," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000084, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny, 2007.
"Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 236-273, January.
- Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny & Eliaz, Kfir, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement," CEPR Discussion Papers 4480, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Debraj Ray & Kfir Eliaz & Ronny Razin, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement," Working Papers 2004.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2003. "Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," NBER Working Papers 9836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
Keywords
linking decisions; mechanism design; incentives; incentive compatibility; bundling;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2003-04-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2003-04-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2003-04-02 (Microeconomics)
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