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Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining

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  • Chakraborty, Archishman
  • Harbaugh, Rick

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  • Chakraborty, Archishman & Harbaugh, Rick, 2003. "Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 357-363, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:78:y:2003:i:3:p:357-363
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1999. "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(12), pages 1613-1630, December.
    2. Mark Armstrong, 1999. "Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 151-168.
    3. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
    4. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    5. William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(3), pages 475-498.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2013. "Informational loss in bundled bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 338-362, July.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Sonnenschein, Hugo F., 2003. "The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency," Working Papers 1159, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. Ménager, Lucie, 2017. "Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: Silence is not golden," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    4. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2014. "Persuasive Puffery," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 382-400, May.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Persuasive Puffery," Working Papers 2012-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    5. Chakraborty, Archishman & Harbaugh, Rick, 2007. "Comparative cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 70-94, January.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2004. "Comparative Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2004-08, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    6. Lee, Barton E., 2022. "Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    7. Hidir, Sinem, 2014. "Strategic Inaccuracy in Bargaining," TSE Working Papers 14-541, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    8. Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 176-194, March.
    9. Lucie Ménager, 2015. "Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden," Working Papers hal-00856078, HAL.

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